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Abstract 
Knowledge elicitation is one of the major bot­
tlenecks in expert system design. Systems 
based on Bayes nets require two types of 
information-network structure and parame­
ters (or probabilities) . Both must be elicited 
from the domain expert. In general, parame­
ters have greater opacity than structure, and 
more time is spent in their refinement than in 
any other phase of elicitation. Thus, it is im­
portant to determine the point of diminishing 
returns, beyond which further refinements will 
promise little (if any) improvement. Sensitivity 
analyses address precisely this issue-the sensi­
tivity of a model to the precision of its param­
eters. In this paper, we report the results of a 
sensitivity analysis of Pathfinder, a Bayes net­
based system for diagnosing pathologies of the 
lymph system. This analysis is intended to shed 
some light on the relative importance of struc­
ture and parameters to system performance, as 
well as the sensitivity of a system based on a 
Bayes net to noise in its assessed parameters. 
1 Introduction 
Over the past ten years or so, expert systems­
large, knowledge-intensive artificial intelligence 
(AI) programs designed to aid decision makers 
and diagnosticians-have become increasingly 
important at many medical, corporate, indus­
trial, military, educational, and other institu-
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tions. The success of an expert system, like that 
of all software, is dependent on two factors, its 
ability to generate accurate (and relevant) infor­
mation and its ability to communicate that in­
formation effectively. Communication between 
the system and its users is generally embodied 
in the user interface; its data is stored in the 
knowledge base and manipulated by the infer­
ence engine. There is a great deal of literature 
about interface design [4] [13], and much has 
been said about the propriety of competing in­
ference techniques [5] [22] [27] [33], uncertainty 
management mechanisms [23], and algorithms 
for propagating belief [15] [21] [24]. Until quite 
recently, general discussions about knowledge 
bases have been conspicuously sparse, and even 
then focused almost entirely on knowledge ac­
quisition. There are, however, other interesting 
aspects of a knowledge base. This paper investi­
gates an expert system's sensitivity to precision 
in the knowledge that it encodes. 
Knowledge acquisition is frequently the bot­
tleneck in system design . Few experts can im­
mediately translate information that they ac­
quired through years of training and experi­
ence into machine-understandable form. In gen­
eral, iterative refinements are necessary to ob­
tain a relatively accurate knowledge base. The 
sensitivity issue, then, is an important one. 
When does the refinement process hit a point 
of diminishing returns? How "good" must the 
encoded information to be considered "good 
enough"? An expert system, like many other 
activities, may hit a flat mazimum, or a point 
beyond which minor changes in input variables 
are highly unlikely to produce major changes in 
the system's output [31]. If a flat maximum is 
reached, there is little point in attempting to re­
fine the expert's assessments. Sensitivity analy­
ses address the potential merits of these further 
refinements-if a knowledge base can be shown 
to be insensitive to the introduction of noise, it 
is unlikely to be helped by the removal of noise. 
Statements about system sensitivity, of course, 
can never be made in a vacuum; different do­
mains will show different sensitivities. This pa­
per presents an analysis of Pathfinder, a medical 
system for lymph node pathology [11] [12]. 
2 Bayes Nets and Pathfinder 
In the past, few sensitivity analyses have been 
performed on expert systems, primarily because 
few systems have been amenable to such analy­
ses. Many "classic" expert system knowledge 
bases were configured as a set of production 
rules, a formalism that was originally popular­
ized because of its proximity to formal logic and 
procedural knowledge. Just as a logical propo­
sition is either true or false, however, the con­
nection between a rule's precedent and its an­
tecedent is either valid or it is not-"minor" 
changes are almost impossible to define. Most 
designers of rule-based systems found pure rules 
to be representationally inadequate, and thus 
augmented them with some form of numeric 
correlation between precedent and antecedent. 
Pathfinder belongs to what may be termed the 
next generation of expert systems. Rather than 
augmenting rules with numbers, Pathfinder's 
primary representation scheme is numeric-the 
system's underlying format emerges from the re­
lationships among these numbers. 
Pathfinder's underlying model is known as a 
Bayes net (24]. A Bayes net, (and its dose rel­
ative, the influence diagram [6] [16] [25] (26]), is 
a graphical representation of a domain in which 
variables are modeled as nodes, relationships 
are modeled by ares, and are weights define the 
strength of that conditionality. In the lymph­
node pathology domain of Pathfinder, for exam­
ple, the nodes represent diseases and symptoms, 
and the arcs indicate dependence between. dis­
eases and symptoms, or among symptoms. An 
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arc from disease A to symptom B indicates that 
the probability with which a patient will exhibit 
symptom B is dependent on whether or not he 
has disease A. The weight on the arc specifies 
that conditional probability. Pathfinder's dis­
ease nodes combine to specify a mutually exclu­
sive and exhaustive set of hypotheses; any pa­
tient being diagnosed by the system is assumed 
to have exactly one of the candidate diseases. 
The task of the diagnostician is to collect evi­
dence that discriminates among them. Thus, at 
any point in time, Pathfinder's partial diagnosis 
may be represented as a probability distribution 
over all the hypotheses. A diagnosis is complete 
when the probability assigned to one of the dis­
eases equals (or approaches) 1.0. 
Every component of a Bayes net must be 
elicited by the system designer from an expert; 
variables (represented as nodes) and their pos­
sible values, relationships (represented as arcs), 
and degrees of influence (represented as prob­
abilities) must all be specified. In addition, 
prior probabilities must be specified across the 
hypotheses, corresponding to the probability 
that each disease will be present, given no pa­
tient specific information. In many of these ar­
eas, however, the expert's initial responses are 
frequently incorrect. If any expert could sit 
down and construct an accurate Bayes net, sys­
tem design would be relatively simple. Unfor­
tunately, few experts are used to thinking of 
their domains in terms amenable to Bayes net 
modeling.1 A trained analyst is necessary to 
help guide them through the process, to pose 
questions that the experts may have overlooked 
themselves, and to make sure that the resultant 
models are internally consistent [1 7}. Some as­
pects of modeling are more difficult than oth­
ers. Devising a list of variables is frequently 
quite simple. Thus, nodes can generally be cre­
ated rather quickly. The range of possible val­
ues taken on by these variables is a bit trickier, 
but relatively uneontroversial. The existence 
1 Ditcuuiom with David Beckerman and Dr. Bharat 
Nathwani indicate that Pathfinder's expert, Dr. Nath­
wani, waa quite comfortable tpecifying probabilities. 
Psychological evidence [19], however, indicate that this 
skill is rare. 
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of a connection between two variables is rarely 
difficult to make, and most experts can easily 
provide the information necessary to draw arcs. 
The determination of appropriate conditional 
probability distributions to serve as arc weights, 
however, is quite difficult and time consuming. 
Increased efficiency in probability assessments 
could greatly reduce the time needed to design 
a system. 
The idea that ballpark probabilities may be 
as powerful as carefully refined assessments is 
not as radical as it sounds. An analysis of 
MYCIN [28), a rule-based expert system that 
used certainty factors, indicated that the cer­
tainty factors associated with the rules were not 
very important to the system's performance­
MYCIN's diagnoses were, in general, identi­
cal with the certainty factor engine on or off 
[3, pages 217-219). In the clinical psychology 
literature on bootstrapping, Dawes described 
a series of tests in which he compared judg­
ments made directly by experts to those gen­
erated by linear model of the experts. In 
addition to the standard, regression weighted 
models, Dawes included some improper linear 
models in which the weights were either ran­
dom or uniform. The result was that all lin­
ear models outperformed raw expert judgment 
[7). Abramson's experiments on chess material­
advantage functions yielded similar results [1] 
[2); in a 28,000 game tournament among expert­
designed, regression-learned, uniform, and ran­
domly generated weights, no single set was able 
to demonstrate superiority over the others. 
3 Sensitivity Analysis 
The goals of a sensitivity analysis are (i) to gain 
insight into the nature of a problem, (ii) to find 
a simple and elegant structure that does justice 
to the problem, and (iii) to check the correct­
ness of the numbers and the need for precision 
in refining them [31, page 387). Although this 
characterization of a sensitivity analysis should 
be familiar to decision analysts, it may appear 
somewhat unusual to people from other fields. 
In most decision problems, once the numbers 
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have reached a certain degree of precision, fur­
ther refinement on these numbers has little ef­
fect on the decisions. Whether similar obser­
vations are true for diagnostic problems, (i.e., 
once the prior and conditional probabilities have 
reached certain quality, further improvement on 
these probabilities has little effect on its diag­
noses), such as Pathfinder's, is the subject of 
this paper. 
The information stored in a Bayes net can be 
divided into two components: 
1. Structure: nodes and arcs. 
2. Parameters: prior and conditional proba­
bilities. 
Network structure plays an obvious role in 
system performance. The full extent of struc­
ture's importance, however, remains to be es­
tablished. Both Dawes' improper linear mod­
els [7) and Abramson's tournaments [2) indicate 
that, at least at times, structure is almost the 
sole determining factor of strength. This study 
was devised to examine the role of parameters 
to Pathfinder's performance. 
Experiments were run on a body of 60 "clas­
sic" cases in which the diagnosis was known. 
Since a network's parameters include prior and 
conditional probabilities, both sets of probabili­
ties had to be varied. The experiments reported 
in the next section used two sets of prior prob­
abilities (those specified by the experts and a 
uniform distribution across the hypotheses) and 
three types of conditionals: 
1. The original values, exactly as assessed by 
experts. 
2. Randomly generated probabilities. This 
class of parameters includes probabilities 
distributed both uniformly and normally. 
3. The values assessed by experts plus ran­
domly generated noise, using both uni­
formly and normally distributed noise func­
tions. 
Each body of tests served a different purpose; 
the original knowledge base define a standard 
against which others may be judged, the ran­
dom parameters addressed the relative impor­
tance of structure and parameters, and the ran­
dom noise addressed the issue of sensitivity. 
The use of two different sets of priors addressed 
the effect of priors on system performance. 
4 Report of Results 
We found that system performance degraded so 
significantly with randomly generated probabil­
ities that the resulting system had negligible dis­
criminating power. These results were observed 
regardless of the distribution function used for 
generating the conditional probabilities or the 
selection of priors. These findings led us to con­
dude that parameters are crucial to a Bayes net 
(or at least to Pathfinder's Bayes net) and that 
experts are needed to provide the parameters. 
Having shown that parameters play an im­
portant role in system performance, our next 
task was to assess the quality of Pathfinder's 
parameters with respect to their sensitivity 
to noise. Some minor changes have been 
made to some conditional probabilities used in 
Pathfinder during system evaluation, to cater 
for mis-diagnoses on several test cases (9], in­
dicating that refining parameters can lead to 
improvement in performance. Our analysis was 
intended to assess all of Pathfinder's parame­
ters. 
Our experiments studied variations in both 
prior and conditional probabilities. Priors were 
fixed either at the expert-assessed set or at 
a uniform set. Conditionals were varied by 
augmenting the expert's assessment with ran­
domly generated noise. The resultant condi­
tional probabilities are then renormalized. The 
random noise functions followed uniform or nor­
mal distributions with p = 0 and several val­
ues of tr. For each noise function, :five parame­
ter sets were created. Sixty cases were run on 
each network, for a total of 300 data points per 
noise function. A total of 7 noise generating 
schemes were used, including uniformly gener­
ated noise (uniform noise), normally generated 
noise (normal noise) with standard deviations 
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( 0') of 0.005, 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, all with 
a mean (p) of 0 (to ensure that any probabil­
ity has equal chance of being increased or de­
creased). A summary of the test results with 
expert priors is shown in Table 1. In the ta­
ble, the percentage of correct diagnoses, (i.e., 
the number of cases in which the known diag­
nosis was assigned the highest probability di­
vided by the total number of cases), is intended 
to provide a measure of the diagnostic power. 
The average confidence, (average difference in 
posterior probabilities between the two diseases 
with the highest posterior probabilities on the 
differential diagnosis for all the cases run), with 
respect to the correct diagnosis2 and incorrect 
diagnosis, provides a measure of the discrimi­
nating power of the leading disease (disease with 
the highest posterior probability on the differ­
ential diagnosis) from the other diseases on the 
differential diagnosis. It should be pointed out 
that although the percentage of correct diagno­
sis is more important than average confidence in 
system performance, average confidence is also 
useful in gauging system performance. Systems 
scoring perfectly (100%) in the correct diagnosis 
column with 0 average confidence (e.g., all dis­
eases have the same posterior probability with 
respect to all the test cases) could be as useless 
a system as one with no correct diagnoses and 
absolute average confidence (1.0). Also shown 
in Table 1 (in the column headed "Percentage 
Better"), is the percentage of cases in which 
the noisy network assigned the correct diagnosis 
with a higher probability than did the original 
network. 
Table 1 indicates that the original knowledge 
base had the highest score in both percentage of 
correct diagnoses and average confidence; aug­
mentation with uniform noise produced the low­
est scores on both items. Adding normal noise 
to the original knowledge base produced a sys­
tem with scores that lie between these extremes, 
with better results for systems with smaller 
standard deviations (or less noise). Further-
2The disease with the bighe•t posterior probability 
on the diKerent diagnosis provided by the system u the 
same as the known diagnosis for a teat cue. 
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22. 0 
Table 1: Summary of results of the sensitivity analysis of Pathfinder. In this set, expert-assessed 
priors were used for all networks. A variety of noise functions were added to the expert's conditional 
probabilities. 
more, the chance of producing a better diag­
nosis than the original knowledge base is higher 
for knowledge bases with less noise than those 
with more noise. All these observations sug­
gest that Pathfinder's knowledge base is of high 
quality and performs well. Table 2 summarizes 
the results of networks with equal priors. The 
results are similar to those of Table 1. 
The results summarized in Tables 1 and 2 
strengthen the evaluations of Pathfinder re­
ported in [12]. In addition to corroborating 
the system's diagnostic power, our experiments 
confirmed both the expert's probability assess­
ments and the effort placed on refining them; 
even marginal noise degraded the system, and 
further refinements would have been unlikely to 
improve it. Of course, this does not necessar­
ily mean that Pathfinder-or any comparable 
system-avoids flat maxima. Standard decision 
analytic sensitivity analyses tend to be of the 
single-fault variety; only one parameter is var­
ied at a time. The typical definition of a flat 
maximum, then, is a situation where minor per­
turbations in any of the system's inputs is un­
likely to have a major impact on its output. Our 
studies showed that even minor changes in all of 
Pathfinder's parameters can have a substantial 
impact on performance. Our decision to vary 
all of the system's parameters simultaneously 
reflects one of the changes that Al imposes on 
DA models: increased size. Pathfinder's under­
lying network-like that of all Bayes net knowl­
edge bases-is much larger than the models typ­
ically used in DA. This size increase motivated 
Pathfinder's designers to introduce similarity 
networks as a workable way of specifying Bayes 
nets [10]; standard constructions were viewed as 
unwieldy. In a similar manner, we felt that there 
were too many variables for individual analy­
sis. Aggregate (simultaneous) analysis was suf­
ficient to address the issue of under-refinement 
vs. over-refinement (or, as our results showed, 
proper refinement). 
In a certain sense, then, our studies were not 
completely fair. In Pathfinder, as in most sys­
tems, variables are not of equal importance, and 
a system's sensitivity to noise is unlikely to be 
uniform across its variables. One of the items 
that we observed during our analysis was that 
some diseases were less susceptible to misdiag­
nosis by the addition of noise. The diagnosis of 
a disease like hairy cell leukemia, for example, 
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24.3 0 
17.7 0 
13.7 0 
10.0 0 
Table 2: Summary of results of the sensitivity analysis of Pathfinder. In this set, uniform priors 
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were used for all networks. A variety of noise functions were added to the expert's conditional I probabilities. 
is based entirely on the presence of hairy cells. 
Noisy probabilities associated with that one key 
symptom have a significant negative impact on 
the system's ability to detect the disease. More 
complicated diagnoses, in which many features 
play a role, are less susceptible to the vagaries 
of a single noisy datum. This observation is not 
surprising; it occurs in many test settings. In a 
complex collection of logic gates, for example, 
simple functions calculated by passing through 
a single gate will be completely unreliable i£ that 
gate is faulty. More complex functions, how­
ever, may be robust enough to be recovered. In 
the same way, simple and obvious diseases will 
be misdiagnosed if noise is introduced in the 
wrong place. Complicated diagnoses are more 
robust. Since these are precisely the data in 
which an expert's assessments are least likely to 
err, analyses like the one described above may 
be biased against the system. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown that parameters 
play an important role in Pathfinder's perfor­
mance; of these parameters, conditional prob-
abilities are more important than priors. Our 
analysis of Pathfinder confirmed the diagnostic 
prowess claimed by its designers. In addition, 
they indicated a well-performed elicitation; the 
assessed probabilities were accurate enough to 
produce near-optimal performance. Although 
these results, in and of themselves, may not ap­
pear earth-shattering, they do highlight an im­
portant point: outsiders (i.e., people other than 
the system's designers) were able to investigate 
and experimentally validate a knowledge engi­
neering exercise. This type of experimentation 
is rare in AI and almost unheard of in knowl­
edge engineering; it was possible, in large part, 
because of the transparency of the Bayes net 
formalism. 
Verifiable, reproducible, and controlled ex­
perimentation is an important part of science, 
and it is one of the areas in which AI has been 
traditionally weak [1). The recent wave of work 
on Bayes nets, however, has suggested several 
different types of experiments: comparisons of 
different uncertainty formalisms [8], competi­
tions between Bayes nets and rule bases [14) 
[20] [30] [32), and several different approaches 
to (and motivations for) sensitivity analyses 
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[18] (29]. For the most part, these studies ad­
dress the behavior of a system; although they 
are all system-specific, they should have some 
general implications to the way in which we 
approach system design. Our results, for ex­
ample, suggest that future system designers 
consider their underlying model's sensitivity to 
noisy parameters before expending time and ef­
fort on parameter refinement. We believe that 
stronger results should be possible, and we hope 
to see many of the experimental techniques of 
behavioral psychology modified to investigate 
knowledge-based systems. Our sensitivity anal­
yses represent what we hope is one step towards 
the development of reproducible controlled ex­
periments for AI systems. 
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